Flora Kesler v. Sherman Brimley Tate and Burton L. Tate v. Transnational Insurance Company : Respondent\u27s Brief by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1972
Flora Kesler v. Sherman Brimley Tate and Burton L.
Tate v. Transnational Insurance Company :
Respondent's Brief
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.Joel M. Allred; Attorney for Respondent Flora KeslerGreg
Hawkins; Attorneys for Respondents TateD. Gary Christian; Attorney for Appellant
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Kesler v. Tate, No. 12806 (Utah Supreme Court, 1972).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/3203
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FLORA KESLER, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
SHERMAN BRIMLEY TATE and 
BURTON L. TATE, 
Defenda1nts and Respondents, 
a.nd 
TRANSNATIONAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY 
I ntervenO'r and Appellant. 
Case No. 
12806 
RESPO·NDENT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from an Order Denying Intervention, 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Honorable Jam es S. Sawaya, Judge 
JOEL M. ALLRED 
610 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorney for Respondoot Kesler 
GREG HAWKINS 
HENRIKSEN, FAIRBOURN AND TATE 
320 South Fifth Ea.st 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondents Tate 
D. GARY CHRISTIAN 
KIPP AND OHRISTIAN 
520 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for .Appellant 
FILED 
MAY 1G1972 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE ---------------------------- 1 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT ---------------------------------------- 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL ---------------------------------------------- 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ---------------------------------------------------------- 2 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THIS COURT HAS PREVIOUSLY HELD THAT THE 
PLAINTIFF'S UNINSURED MOTORIST CARRIER 
IS NOT A PROPER PARTY TO THE LAWSUIT BE-
TWEEN THE PLAINTIFF INSURED AND THE DE-
FENDANT TORTFEASOR. ------------------------------------------------ 4 
POINT II. 
DEFENSE COUNSEL'S CONCLUSIONS IN THE IN-
STANT CASE ARE AT VARIANCE WITH THOSE 
PREVIOUSLY URGED UPON THIS COURT.-------------- 9 
POINT III. 
THE AUTHORITIES WHICH HA VE CONSIDERED 
THE QUESTIONS OF JOINDER AND INTERVEN-
TION HOLD CONFLICTING VIEWS. ---------------------------· 12 
POINT IV 
THE APPELLANT WAS DILATORY IN PROTECT-
ING ITS INTERESTS AND IN SERVICING ITS 
INSURED. A DECISION FOR INTERVENTION 
WOULD FORCE THE PLAINTIFF TO UNDER-
WRITE THE DEFENSE OF HER OWN CLAIM. -------- 15 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 
Page 
POINT V 
THE APPLICANT FOR INTERVENTION FAILED 
TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF 
RULE 24 OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PRO-
CEDURE. ----····---······--··-·---··-----------·-----------------·-----------··------··-18 
A. The Applicant Failed to File a Pleading Setting 
Forth the Claim or Defense for Which Intervention 
was Sought. ---------------------------------------------------------------·----·· 18 
B. The Application of the Prospective Intervenor was 
Untimely. -----------------------------------------------------------------------·-- 20 
C. There Is No Showing Upon Appeal, and There was 
None Before the Trial Court, that the Representation 
of the Appellant's Interest Is or Was Inadequate. ____ 21 
D. The Applicant for Intervention was Not a Proper 
Party to the Lawsuit When it was Commenced. ------·· 23 
CONCLUSION ---·--------------·--··------------------------·---------------······---·-···· 23 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 
Page 
CASES CITED 
Allstate Insurance Company v. Hunt, 450 S.W. 2d 668 .... 14, 17 
Alston v. Amalgamated Mutual Casualty Company, 53 
Misc. 2d 90, 278 N.R.S. 2d 906 ........................................... 13 
Atlantic Refining Company v. Port Lobos Petroleurn 
Corp., D Del 1922) 280 Fed 934 ......................................... 19 
Barnhart v. Civil Service Employees Insurance Company, 
16 Ut. 2d 223, 398 P.2d 873 ............................................... 11 
Chandler & Price v. Brnndtjcn & [{lug, 296 U.S. 53, 
56 S. Ct 6, 80 L. Ed. 38 (1935) ......................................... 19 
Christensen v. Peterson, 25 Ut.2d 411, 483 P.2d 447 ....... 4, 15, 23 
Hernandez v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Company, (La.) 192 So.2d 679 ............................................ 14 
Holt v. Bell, (Okla.) 392 P.2d 361 .......................................... 5, 15 
Indiana Insurance Company v. Noble, (Ind.) 265 N.E. 2d 419 .. 13 
In Re Finger Lakes Land Co., (WD NY 1939) 29 
F.Supp 50, 1 FR Serv ........................................................... 19 
Kirouac v. Healy, (N. H.) 181 A.2d 634 ................................. 14 
Lamb v. Harwick, 48 Ill App.2d 251, 198 N.E.2d 194 ............. 13 
McDonald v. United States, (9 Cir.) 119 F.2d 821. ................ 21 
Matthews v. Allstate Insurance Company, 194 F. Supp 459 ..... 13 
Miami Company National Bank v. Bancroft, (CCA 10th, 
1941) 121 F.2d 921, 5 FR Serv. 246.4 Case 1 ................ 19 
Mullins v. De Soto Security Company, (WD La. 1942) 
2 FRD 502. ........................................................................ 19, 21 
Price v. Hansen, 60 U.29, 206 P.272 ........................................ 23 
Securities & Exchange Commission v. Bloomberg, (CCA 
1st, 1962) 299 F.2d 315 ....................................................... 21 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 
Page 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company vs. 
Lester E. Brown, et al, 114 Ga. App 650, 152 
S.E.2d 641 ( 1966). -----------------------------------------------·-·········-·----13 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company vs. 
Glover, 113 Ga. App. 815, 149 S.E.2d 852. --------···············-13 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company vs. 
Jiles, 115 Ga. App. 193, 149 S.E.2d 852. -----------··---·········---13 
Young v. Barney, 20 Ut.2d 108, 433 P.2d 846. ----------------7, 11, 23 
RULES CITED 
Rule 24, U.R.C.P., subsections (a), (b), (c). ----------------18, 20, 21 
STATUTES CITED 
41-2-10 U.C.A., 1953 ----------------------················································ 3 
41-2-22 U.C.A., 1953 -----------------------------------------------············--··-··----3 
Ga. L. 1963, amended 1964, Code Ann 56-407.1 ·········-··-----·--·-13 
TREATISES CITED 
3 B Moore's Federal Practice, sections 23.09, 24.12 
and 24.13 -------·····-··------------··--·--··--·-·····---······················19, 20, 22 
IN THE SUPREME·coURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FLORA KESLER, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
SHERMAN BRIMLEY TATE and 
BURTON L. TATE, 
Defendants and Respondents, 
and 
TRANSNATIONAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
Intervenor and Appellant. 
Case No. 
12806 
RESPO,NDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action by the plaintiff against the defen-
dants, who are uninsured, for property damage and 
bodily injury sustained in an automobile collision which 
occurred on September 22, 1970. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Although made aware of the filing of these proceed-
ings prior to October 5, 1971, (R. 55) the date of the 
filing of the Complaint, the plaintiff's uninsured motorist 
carrier, Transnational Insurance Company (hereinafter 
1 
sometimes designated "Transnational"), did not file its 
Motion for Leave to Intervene until January 13, 1972, 
over three months later. At the time the Motion was filed 
' substantial discovery had been and was being completed 
and the case was at issue. A Request for Trial Setting 
had been filed (R. 70). 
At the time of the Hearing on the appellant's Motion 
for Leave to Intervene all counsel were present nnd both 
the plaintiff and the defendant were heard in opposition. 
1 
Having heard counsel; having analyzed plaintiff's 
memorandum of authorities on file; and having rPquired 
additional time in which to read the Utah cases recited 
in the memorandum, the District Court, J a:mes S. Sawaya 
presiding, denied the applicant's motion for interven- 1 
tion. This appeal is from that denial. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The plaintiff-respondent, Flora Kesler, seeks the 
affirmance of the Order of the Third District Court 
denying the appellant's Motion for Leave to Intervene. 1 
STATEMENT OF F AC11S 
On September 22, 1970, at approximately 7 :41 p.m., 
the plaintiff's automobile was struck from behind by a 
large dump truck driven by Sherman Brimley Tate and 
owned by his father, Burton L. Tate, or by a corporation 
in which Burton L. Tate was a principal. The collision 
occurred at the intt>rsection of 1300 South and State 
Streets in Salt Lake City. Immediately prior to the 
collision the plaintiff was stopped and parked at a 
traffic semaphore waiting for the light to change. 
2 
The plaintiff, who was injured, filed a lawsuit against 
tlw defendants, alleging that the defendant, Sherman 
Brimley Tate, failed to maintain a proper lookout; failed 
to properly maintain and control a motor vehicle, and, 
further, that he was driving with faulty and defective 
brakes (R. 1). Plaintiff also contended that the truck 
was negligently entrusted to Sherman Brimley Tate, a 
minor, and that his father, in any event, was jointly and 
,.;evernll:v liable unuer the provisions of 41-2-10 and 41-2-
22 U.C.A. 1953 a;;; amended. The <lefendants, denying 
most of the allegations of the Complaint, answered that 
the.y were unable to stop hPcause of the brakes; that 
tlH')' were not adequately aware of the defect and that 
the collision vvas the result of sudden peril and unavoid-
able (R. 4). 
As a result of the collision, the plaintiff, alleging 
serious and pennanent injuries, prayed judgment for 
her medical costs and pain and suffering. The action 
was filed on October 5, 1971. 
On January 13, 1972, the appellant, Transnational, 
Mrs. Kesler's uninsured motorist carrier, moved for 
leave to intervene, not having been joined in the lawsuit. 
The Order denying intervention was entered on January 
26, 1972. 
Prior to the commencement of the lawsuit, the plain-
tiff had attempted to settle her case with Transnational 
and to arrange for arbitration and, failing in this, to 
secure Transnational's consent to the suit against the 
tortfeasor defendants (See: R. 48-58). In each instance, 
although the requests were, for the most part, specified 
in writincr the plaintiff's efforts met with no response. bl 
3 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THIS COURT HAS PREVIOUSLY HELD THAT THE 
PLAINTIFF'S UNINSURED MOTORIST CARRIER IS 
NOT A PROPER PARTY TO THE LAWSUIT BE-
TWEEN THE PLAINTIFF INSURED AND THE 
DEFENDANT TORTFEASOR. 
In the case of Christensen v. Peterson, 25 Ut. 2d 411, 
483 P. 2d 447, two plaintiffs injured in an automobile 
accident filed a single complaint stating three separate 
causes of action. Plaintiff Christensen filed a cause of 
action sounding in tort against the tortf easor Peterson. 
Plaintiff Larsen filed a cause of action sounding in tort 
against the same defendant. The two plaintiffs, Christen-
sen and Larsen, then jointly stated a cause of action 
in contract against Allstate Insurance Company, the 
holder of the plaintiff's uninsured motorist coverage. 
The attorney for Allstate Insurance Company in the 
Christensen case was D. Gary Christian, who is presently 
counsel for Transnational Insurance Company, the in-
tervenor-appellant. It is interesting to note that this 
case is not cited in the appellant's Brief. 
The plaintiffs in the Christensen case argued to the 
trial court that there was an improper joinder of parties 
and a misjoinder of remedies. The trial court concurred 
with those contentions and dismissed Allstate from the 
lawsuit. This Court, on appeal, affirmed the dismissal, 
agreeing with the insurer's claim on both points. 
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If there was a misjoinder of remedies and an improp-
er joinder of parties in the Christensen case, it is clear 
those same fundamental objections are present on this 
appeal. The claim of Mrs. Kesler against the tortfeasor 
defendants is a tort claim, while the claim of Mrs. Kesler 
against Transnational Insurance Company, her own in-
surer, is based in contract. In the Christensen case it 
was argued that the joinder of the insurance company as 
a named defendant would give "an unfair advantage" 
to the plaintiffs. While appellant can argue that it is 
willing to risk the unfair advantage inherent in the 
situation and join in the lawsuit at its own peril, this 
argument conveniently overlooks the fundamental ob-
jection that this Court has held that tort and contract 
actions cannot, under these circumstances, be joined. 
If the plaintiff can clearly not join the uninsured 
motorist carrier under the Christensen rationale, then 
the issue becomes can the uninsured motorist carrier join 
itself, when it chooses, under the principles enunciated 
in that case. This Court has strongly inferred that the 
answer is no. In Christensen, the Court cited approv-
ingly the Oklahoma case of Holt v. Bell, 392 P. 2d 361, 
and noted that the Oklahoma Supreme Court had con-
sistentlv held in tort actions when liability insurance was 
involved that the insurer could not be joined with the 
tortfeasor unless it was a policy required by statute. 
This Court then indicated that "The reason for such a 
rule is equally applicable where the insurer's obligation 
is under an uninsured motorist endorsement, ... '' The 
Court quoting from Holt v. Bell, supra at 363, stated 
as the central theme of its decision, that, 
5 
"-When the parties are placed in a position 
where the interest of an insurer is to defeat the 
claim of its own insured, the position of the 
parties is such that the court cannot countenance 
tJ.te situation. The placing of the parties thusly 
yirtually makes the plaintiff's insurer the liability 
msurer of the defendant and interested in def eat-
ing plaintiff's claim. Such being the case, under 
the holdings of this court, the insurer cannot be 
joined as a party defendant." 
To intervene "as a defendant'' is, of course, precisely 
what Transnational Insurance Company has attempted 
to do ( R. 16). The Christensen option serves to con-
trovert the statement of the appellant that it is "unable 
to find any Utah cases directly in point dealing with the 
question here presented for consideration" unless that 
statement is given a very strained and narrow inter-
pretation (appellant's Brj ef, p. 3). 
The intnvenhon of the insurance company m the 
uninsured motorist situation is as potentially harmful 
to the tortfeasor as it is to the insured in the liability 
insurance situation. In the uninsured motorist situation, 
the tortfeasor is normally ultimately responsible for tlw 
payment of any .award despite the fact that the insurance 
company may have paid under the uninsured motorist 
provisions of its policy. Normally this is accomplished, 
if the case is settled prior to trial, by the insurer bring-
ing its claim in the name of the insured as if it \Vere 
subrogated to the insured's interest. There is a wide 
range of possibilities available to the insurer if this court 
were to hold that it could join itself, although it could 
not be joined by others. If the case settled, the insurer 
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could bring suit against the tortfeasor in the name of 
tlw insured and compel, under the terms of the policy, 
the cooperation of the insured. If the insured filed an 
action against the tortfeasor, as in this ease, the insurer 
could on the intervention theory urged here align itself 
against its own insured in its own name, as appellant 
seeks to do, or perhaps in the name of the tortfeasor, as 
if it were the tortfeasor's liability insurer. If the insured 
prevailed, the insurer could pay the amount of the award, 
and, in the insured's name, proceed to collect the money 
back from the tortfeasor, its former client. ·whether one 
th«n finds the insurt>r lurking behind the insured or the 
tortf Pasor, or acting in its own name, would depend 
npon the circumstances of the individual case. Each 
situation, with the exception of a subrogation claim de-
rived from its own insured, involves serious theoretical 
and ethical impediments. 
To permit the insurance company to join the tort-
feasors as a named co-defendant is to permit, as far as 
the tortf easors are concerned, the same destructive pos-
sibility that the jury will consider the insurance rather 
than the rules of law relating to liability and damages 
which exists in the liability insurance situation.1 
It will not suffice to say, in this case, that the inter-
vention of the uninsured motorist carrier could be con-
1 The Court's conclusion that the question of insurance should 
not be injected into the trial of a personal injury lawsuit could 
not, according to Justice Crockett, be more explicit unless the 
Court had said "damn it." Young v. Barney, 20 Ut. 2d 108, 433 
P.2d 846. 
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ducted in the name of the tortf easor without the carrier 
being expressly named because: 
1. The appellant-insurer requested in its motion that 
it be named as a defendant-intervenor and permitted to 
file an Answer in its own right. 
2. This court in the Christensen case has specifically 
denied the joinder of the insurer as a party defendant. 
3. The claim of the plaintiff against the insurer de-
rives from contract and is not a tort. Conversely the 
rights of the insurer against the insured, if any, are 
based in contract. The joinder of two claims, contract 
and tort, in a single action under these circumstances 
was proscribed by the Christensen case. 
4. The tortf easor and the insurer are themselves 
potential litigants with inconsistent and conflicting in-
terests. 
Conceptually, there is less reason in the case before 
the court to permit intervention than there was to per-
mit joinder in the Christensen case. In Christensen, the 
court said that joinder of the insurer would constitute 
treating the plaintiff's insurer as the liability insurer 
of the defendant interested in defeating plaintiff's claim. 
At least in that situation the plaintiff, by attempting to 
effect such a joinder, has concurred that such a result 
is permissible. Surely it becomes, under the rationale 
of these two cases, much more difficult to "countenance 
the situation" where such a result is imposed upon the 
insured plaintiff without his consent. 
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Whether the question is joinder or intervention; 
whether the participation of the insurer is requested by 
the plaintiff or by the insurer itself, the same funda-
mental considerations raised to support the decision in 
Christensen apply. There is, considering that case, no 
logical basis for drawing a distinction between the two 
situations. The Trial Court, considering the Christensen 
holding, could not have ruled otherwise. 
In the liability insurance situation where the Court 
has been most emphatic in its exclusion of the insurer 
as a named defendant, it is conceivable that an insurer 
could be named without harmful effects to interests other 
than its own. That is to say that unless the coverage 
was inadequate to protect any residual interest of a 
named defendant insured, that the only party injured 
by th<' jury's consideration of the element of insurance 
would be the insurer itself. In this case, however, the 
intervention of the insurer in its own right, under its 
own name, could be seriously and ultimately injurious 
to the tortfeasor with whom the insurer has only a limited 
community of interest. 
POINT II 
DEFENSE COUNSEL'S CONCLUSIONS IN THE IN-
STANT CASE ARE AT VARIANCE WITH THOSE 
PREVIOUSLY URGED UPON THIS COURT. 
Plaintiff concedes that argument is argument and 
that what counsel had to say on a prior occasion may 
have been dictated by the practical exigencies of his em-
ployment. The mention of certain contradictory prior 
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conclusions is not intended to embarrass counsel or to 
stress, unfairly, inconsistencies between his past and 
present positions. 
The arguments advancPd in Mr. Christian's Brief in 
the Christensen case are eminently reasonable and 
persuasive. They were, in a sense, the raw material for 
the Christensen opinion and have, consequently, both his-
torical and explanatory significance. 
The conclusions of appellant's present counsel in that 
earlier case \Vere as follows: 
1. " ... before the Plaintiff is entitled to be reim-
bursed from the Defendant [i. e. Allstate] there must 
have been a legal determination that he comes within 
the scope of the policy providing for uninsured motorist 
coverage. . . " (Brief, Allstate Insurance Company, 
hereinafter "Allstate Brief," Case No. 12065, Utah Su-
preme Court, p. 7). 
It was argued that the ''legal determination" required 
proof of: 
(a) Liability on the part of the tortfeasor. 
(b) The amount of the damages. 
( c) The absence of insurance. 
2. " ... that the Plaintiff mitst initiate legal action 
against the tortfeasor to determine the amount of his 
damages ... " (Allstate Brief, p. 8). 
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Quoting the earlier Utah case of Barnhart v. Civil 
Service Employees Insurance Company, 16 Ut. 2d 223, 
398 P. 2d 873, it was argued that, 
"Whether plaintiffs are legally entitled to re-
cover from W elcker [the uninsured motorist] 
and, if so, the amount of damages could only be 
determined between the plaintiffs and Welcker" 
(Allstate Brief, p. 8, emphasis supplied). 
3. " ... an insured Plaintiff would not be allowed 
to join Plaintiff's insurer as a co-defendant in an action 
against an allegedly uninsured tortfeasor Defendant on 
the basis of un-insured motorist coverage contained in 
Plaintiff's insurance policy." (Allstate Brief, p. 8). 
4. "It also seems clear that the policy [similar to 
the policy in the instant case] contemplates that an action 
must be filed against the alleged wninsitred motorist and 
the issues of liability and damages and lack of insiirance 
must be determined in a separate proceeding 
(Allstate Brief, p. 9, emphasis supplied). 
" 
Concluding that the cases and the arguments suffi-
ciently established the misjoinder of remedies, Mr. Chris-
tian then proceeded to indicate that there was a further 
compelling reason why the dismissal should be affirmed, 
that being the improper joinder of parties. He quoted 
from the case of Yowng v. Barney, 20 Ut. 2d 108, 443 
P. 2d 846, which indicated that it was prejudicial error 
to deliberately inject the subject of insurance coverage 
in a personal injury trial. To inject such issues would 
give the Plaintiff "an unfair advantage" (Allstate Brief, 
p. 10) in that the verdict might be based upon the fact 
11 
that there is insmance coverage available rather than 
upon the rules of law relating to the issues of legal lia-
bility and damages. 
Finally, summarizing, the Brief concluded: 
1. " ... It is improper for Plaintiffs to join in a 
single Complaint, causes of action and remedies based 
in contract and in tort ... " 
2. " ... the proper procedure for the Plaintiffs to 
follow in this case is to file their action against the alleged 
tortfeasor and have the issues of liability and damages 
decided by a judge or a jury or a court of competent 
jurisdiction as mandatory conditions precedent to any 
action against the insurance company ... " (Emphasis 
supplied). 
In obedience to those basic precepts, and subject to 
the rulings of this Court, the plaintiff proceeded to file 
its action directly against the tortfeasors for the deter-
mination of liability and damage issues. 
POINT III 
THE AUTHORITIES WHICH HAVE CONSIDERED 
THE QUESTIONS OF JOINDER AND INTERVEN-
TION HOLD CONFLICTING VIEWS. 
The appellant has relied almost exclusively on the 
citation of authorities from other jurisdictions to sup-
port its argument for intervention. The Utah cases 
mentioned in the Brief are old and do not specifically 
relate to the subject of uninsured motorist coverage. 
1~ 
Many of the nme out-of-state cases cited in appellant's 
Brief are, for different reasons, distinguishable. 2 
2Three of the cited decisions were from the State of Georgia. 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company vs. Lester 
E. Brown, et al, 114 Ga. App. 650, 152 S. E. 2d 641 (1966); 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company vs. Glover, 
113 Ga. App. 815, 149 S. E. 2d 852; State Farm Mutual Auto-
mobile Insurance Company vs. Jiles, 115 Ga. App. 193, 154 S. E. 
2d 286 (1967). In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Company v. Glover, supra, the first of the Georgia cases, the 
tortfeasor filed no defensive pleadings. The court permitted in-
tervention "where the case is in default as to the uninsured 
motorist." This position was later extended. State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Company v. Brown, supra. Georgia had 
a peculiar statute which the Court relied upon expressly stating 
that "The answer is in the construction of the uninsured motorist 
laws." Justice Pannell, specially concurring, also confirmed that 
the majority "has seen fit to base its conclusions upon a con-
struction of that Act" ... [Ga. L. 1963, p. 588 et seq. as amended 
by Ga. L. 1969, p. 306 et seq; Code Ann 56-407 .1]. The same 
statute had application in each of the three Georgia cases. It 
has no Utah counterpart. 
In Matthews v. Allstate Insurance Company, 194 F. Supp. 
459, the right of the insurer to intervene was "permissive". As 
indicated there, 
"Had the defendant appropriately raised the question in the 
state court, it is not unlikely that, under the terms of the policy 
endorsement, the insurance company would have been permitted 
to intervene .... That such permissive joinder is proper is evi-
denced by ... " (Emphasis supplied) 
Where joinder is permissive, the grant or denial of inter-
vention is discretionary with the trial court and subject to 
reversal only for abuse of discretion. This case does not serve 
to support Transnational's basic contention that it is entitled as 
a matter of right to intervene. Note that the question of inter-
vention must, in any event, according to the Matthews decision, 
be "appropriately" raised. 
In Lamb v. Horwick, 48 III App 2d 251, 198 N.E. 2d 194, 
there was no written opinion. No facts are recited; no law is 
stated and the court said nothing more than that the insurer 
should be "permitted" to intervene. 
Indiana Insurance Company v. Noble, 265 N. E. 2d 419, as 
well as Alston v. Amalgamated Mutual Casualty Company, 53 
Alise. 2d 90, 278 N.Y. S. 2d 906, started from a different premise. 
13 
j 
A careful sm·vpy of th!' cast's \\'hich havp consid<'r1·f\ 
the question of intervtintion and joindt>r indicates that 
the con rts hold conflicting vi(~Ws. 
In thf' case of Allstate Insurance Company v. Ili111t, : 
450 S.vV. 2d G68, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals dP-
ni<'d intervention by the insurer, Allstate Insurance 
Company. Before the trial court, Allstate moved that 
its identity be withheld from th<> jury. By means of a 
motion for severnnc(' Allstate succeeded in obtainin~ ' 
(') 
separate trials of the tort and contract questions. It then 
attempted to participate in the trial of the tort claim, in 
which it w:is not a named defendant, in a defense role. 
The trial court excluded Allstate from the trial of the 
tort claim. 
The issue on appeal was ·whether or not the insurer 
could defend the claim of its own insured against the 
uninsured motorist. This was a matter of "first imprPs-
sion" in Texas. 
The Texas Court, after specifically referring to six 
of the nine cases recited in the present appellant's Brief, 
affirmed the trial court citing supporting authority 
from a number of jurisdictions. 3 The lead cast> upon 
Both Indiana and New York permitted an insured to file his 
original action directly against the insurer. To permit the in· 
surer then, to intervene, was a mere logical extension of the 
Court's first position. This Court, however, in the Christ~ns_en 
case, expressly rejected a direct cause of action by the plamt1ff 
against the insurer. 
sHernandez v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Company (La.), 192 So. 2d 679, Kirouac v. Healy, (N.H.) 181 A. 
2d 634, other cases there cited. 
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which the Court relied was that of the Oklahoma Su-
preme Court in Holt v. Bell, supra. Holt v. Bell, of 
course, was the case approvingly cited and liberally 
quoted from in this Court's earlier decision in Christen-
sen v. Peterson, sitpra. 
The Texas Court indicated that a contrary ruling 
would result in serious "ethical" problems between the 
insurer, its insured and the uninsured motorist. It held 
that the insurer had "fiduciary'' responsibilities with re-
spect to its insured, and, if it defended him, to the un-
insured motorist as well. 
If there were a counterclaim m such a case there 
would be, concluded the court, a hopeless conflict since 
the insurer would be defending its insured's claim on 
the one hand, and have the duty and obligation to defend 
the insured on the other. 
The conflict of interest "potentially present" in every 
case demanded non-intervention. The Texas case, which 
had its roots in Holt v. Bell, like its Utah counterpart, 
Christensen v. Peterson, s1tpra, which had its roots m 
Holt v. Bell, seems to reflect the more rational view. 
POINT IV 
THE APPELLANT WAS DILATORY IN PROTECT-
ING ITS INTEREST AND IN SERVICING ITS IN-
SURED. A DECISION FOR INTERVENTION 
WOULD FORCE THE PLAINTIFF TO UNDER-
WRITE THE DEFENSE OF HER OWN CLAIM. 
The plaintiff, Mrs. Kesler, and the appellant, Trans-
national Insurance Company, are not strangers. When 
it became apparent that h1e~r injuries were serious, Mrs. 
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Kesler contacted counsel to assist her in negotiating her 
claim. 
On May 25, 1971, Mrs. Kesler's counsel corresponded 
with D. W. Langrock, appellant's agent (R. 51). Pro-
visions were made for a settlement conference which took 
place in the latter part of .June, 1971, at counsel's office 
(R. 48). Mr. Langrock was furnished with materials 
pertaining to the claim and a demand was made (Affi-
davit, R. 48). The appellant did not respond to the 
plaintiff's offer of settlement by saying either yes or 
no or by making any counter-offer. On August 26, 1971, 
plaintiff's counsel in compliance with paragraph 8 of 
the conditions specified in the uninsured motorist cover-
age endorsement (R. 69) made a demand for arbitration 
(R. 52). On September 15, 1971, twenty days after thl' 
demand was made, plaintiff had received no response 
to the demand for arbitration (R. 49). On September 
15, 1971, the demand was withdrawn and the appellant 
was informed of impending litigation (R. 53). Under the 
terms of Mrs. Kesler's policy, the insurer's consent to 
be sued is required before a lawsuit can be commenced. 
In connection with the correspondence of September 15, 
1971, plaintiff requested consent to litigate the matter. 
On October 5, 1971, the date the lawsuit was commenced, 
the plaintiff had received no response to her offer of 
settlement; no response to her demand for arbitration; 
no response to her request for consent to proceed against 
the tortfeasors and no response to the threat of impend-
ing litigation (Affidavit, R. 48). Basically, Transna-
tional took no steps to protect or safeguard its interests 
from the time of the settlement conference in June of 
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1971, to the time of the filing of the motion to intervene 
in January of 1972. 
On October 5, 1971, the lawsuit was commenced, with-
out appellant's consent and in technical or apparent vio-
lation of the terms of the plaintiff's policy. The appellant 
was, on October 1, 1971, both sent in the mail and served 
with copies of the pleadings (R. 55). Under the appli-
cable rulings of this court, the plaintiff could not join 
Transnational as a party. Plaintiff's dilemma, then, 
was that she could not sue the appellant directly under 
the decisions of this court. She could not sue the tort-
f easor under the terms of her policy without Transna-
tional's written consent which she could not acquire (R., 
unmarked, between 68 and 69). Only some three months 
after the lawsµit was commenced, after substantial dis-
covery had been completed, did the appellant first move 
to intervene and· legally safeguard the interests which 
it now deems to be so imminently critical. 
If intervention were permitted, Mrs. Kesler would 
face one final indignity, that of underwriting the defense 
of her own claim. Her own insurer, in direct contradic-
tion to her most personal interests, and to its fiduciary 
responsibilities4 would attempt to defeat the claim aris-
ing from the negligence of the uninsured motorist. 
':Vhere the uninsured motorist has engaged counsel 
and is adequately represented, (nothing in the record or 
on this appeal suggests otherwise) the tortf easor's own 
4Allstate Insurance Company v. Hunt, Tex Civ App, 450 
S. W. 2d 668. 
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interests dictate that he be permitted to handle his own 
defense. Whereas, .Mrs. Kesler, to be adPquately pro-
tected, must locate her own counsel and arrange for his 
services, the uninsured motorist (if he had not engaged 
counsel) would, if intervention were permitted, be Pn-
hanced by the qualified efforts of the plaintiff's insurer, 
m effect at plaintiff's expense. 
Transnational Insurance Company has had numerous 
prior opportunities to protect its vital interests, such as 
they are, essentially all of which have been imperiously 
disregarded. To permit intervention now, under the cir-
cumstances, would seriously prejudice the plaintiff and 
unfairly privilege the appellant. 
POINT V 
THE APPLICANT FOR INTERVENTION FAILED 
TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF 
RULE 24 OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PRO-
CEDURE. 
A. The Applicant Faifod to File a Pleading Setting 
Forth the Claim or Defense for Which Intervention ica~ 
Sought. 
Rule 24( c) as amended provides as follows: 
"PROCEDURE. A person desiring to inter-
vene shall serve a motion to intervene upon the 
parties as provided in Rule 5. The motions shall 
state the grounds therefor and shall be accom-
panied by a pleading setting forth the claim or 
defense for which intervention is sought" (Em-
phasis supplied). 
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The Utah rule on procedure is similar to the federal 
rule. Prior to the enactment of the federal rule, which 
served as the model for its Utah counterpart, federal 
practice was governed by the principles enunciated in 
the 1922 case of Atlantic Refining Co. v. Port Lobos 
Petroleum Corp., (D Del 1922) 280 Fed 934. One of those 
threshold principles, since incorporated in the federal 
and state rules, was the requirement that the petition 
must present a well-pleaded defense. In a later case be-
fore the United States Supreme Court this was deter-
mined to imply that a proposed answer be presented. 
Chandler d3 Price v. Brandtje·n d3 Klug, 296 U. S. 53, 56 
S. Ct 6, 80 L. Ed 39 ( 1935). Rule 24( c), a 1937 innova-
tion, adopted, in the main, the procedure outlined in the 
federal cases. It requires that the applicant for inter-
vention must "in all cases" present his proposed plead-
ing, whether it is defensive, or aggressive. 3 B Moore's 
Federal Practice, section 24.12, p. 502. The pleading is 
to be served with the motion. 3 B Moore's Federal Prac-
ticr, section 24.12, p. 504. The pleading must set forth 
the claim or defense for which intervention is sought. 
In Re Finger Lakes Land Co., (WD NY 1939) 29 F Supp 
50, 1 FR Serv 24c.11, Case 1; Miami County Na.tional 
Bank v. Bancroft (CCA 10th, 1941) 121 F. 2d 921, 5 FR 
Serv 246.4, Case 1. The moti"'n may not "adopt" the 
pleading of an original party Mullins v. De Soto Sec. Co. 
(WD La 1942) 2 FRD 502, nor may it merely describe a 
future pleading. In the Mullins case the court found 
that "under the present rules [24(c)] the application to 
intervene is defective if unaccompanied by a proposed 
pleading." In that case the motion to intervene did 
19 
contain language whereby the applicants proposect to 
adopt the allegations of the petition and the motions of 
the original parties. 
In the case before the court, Transnational Insurance , 
Company presented no "well-pleaded defense", served 
no answer with its motion, set forth no legal basis for thr 
requested intervention, did not purport to adopt the 
pleadings, by reference or otherwise, of the original 
parties and merely claimed "the right" to file an answer 1 
at some future time. 
B. The Application of the Prospective Interverwr i 
was Untimely. 
Whether intervention is "of right" or "permissive", 
an application for intervention must be "timely". (Rules 
24(.a) and (b), U.R.C.P., 3 B Moore's Federal Practice, 
section 24.13, p. 521). The plaintiff's Complaint was 1 
filed on October 5, 1971 (R. 1). Copies of the pleadings 
were at that time served upon the prospective inter-
venor. Not until January 13, 1972, more than three 
months later, was Transnational's Motion for Leave to 
Intervene filed with the Court (R. 16). In the interim 
period, an Answer was interposed (R. 4), Interrogatories 
were served by the plaintiff (R. 5), Answers were re-
ceived (R. 11), and a Request for Trial Setting was filed 
(R. 70). An original party would not have received the 
same consideration that the appellant contends it is 
entitled to had such original party taken no action for 
a three month period. Where a case is substantially 
underway when intervention is sought, such intervention 
is "tardy" and will "usually be denied." 3 B Moore's 
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Federal Practice, section 24.13, p. 523. See: Securities 
ct Exchange Commission v. Bloomberg, (CA 1st, 1962) 
299 F. 2d 315. 
C. There Is No Showing Upon Appeal, and There 
was None Before the Trial Court, that the Representa-
tion of the Appellant's Interests Is or Was bwdequate. 
In order for appellant's intervention to be permitted 
under the provisions of Rule 24(a), it must be shown 
that the representation of its interest by existing parties 
is or may be inadequate and that the applicant is or may 
be bound by a judgment in the action (Rule 24(a) 
U.R.C.P.). Both conditions must be shown to exist be-
fore intervention is authorized. Mullins v. De Soto Se-
curities Co., 2 F.R.D. 502 at 504; McDonald v. United 
States, (9 Cir.) 119 F. 2d 821. A careful search of the 
record in no way indicates that the tortfeasor has failed 
to i,,;ecure adequate representation to protect such in-
terei,,;b,:; as the tortfeasor and the appellant jointly have. 
Only the statement that counsel for the plaintiff and for 
the defendants could stipulate to a judgment in favor 
of the plaintiff which might ultimately be paid by Trans-
national supports this contention (appellant's Brief, p. 
10). Even then counsel is hasty to add that, "It should 
be made clear that appellant does not contend or allege 
that counsel for the parties are going to so act at this 
time; however, appellant is subject to that risk." 
The tortfeasor defendants have their own incentives 
to minimize the recovery or avoid it altogether. Those 
incentives are frustrated, as to them, if the insurer is 
injrcted into the lawsuit as a named defendant. 
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The burden of showing that the representation of its 
interest is inadequate is upon the applicant for interven-
tion. 3 B llloore's Federal Practice, section 24.09, p. 31G. 
A careful reading of appellant's Brief does not constitut1~ 
persuasive evidence that this burden has been met. 
Consider briefly two other points in this context. 
First, the judgment in this matter, if there is one, will 
not automatically bind Transnational, the applicant. lt 
will be necessary to bring a separate action on a contract 
theory before this can be accomplished. Consequently, 
the judgment in the action before the Court does not 1 
bind the insurer unless the Court finds that it does in 
the subsequent action on the contract. 
Second, in theory as in practice, the insurer will ul-
timately look to the tortfeasor for the payment of the 
judgment. Only, as a practical matter, in the event of 
the tortf easor's insolvency is the insurer charged with 
the ultimate payment. 
Summarizing, there has been no satisfactory showing 
that the appellant's interests are inadequately repre-
sented or that the applicant for intervention is or may 
be bound by "a judgment in thP action" before the Court. 
"Even though the applicant may be bound by the judg-
ment, he cannot intervene as of right if he is as a fact 
adequately represented by the existing parties to the 
action." Lavine and Horning, "Manual of Federal 
Practice", p. 346, quoting Moore. The intervenor must 
not merely show that there is a possibility that the rep-
resentation of his interest is inadequate, but that he is 
in fact inadequately represented. 
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D. The Applicant for Intervention was Not a Proper 
Party to the Lawsuit When it was Commenced. 
This Court has previously indicated that 
" ... a party seeking to intervene in a particular 
action should make it appear in his application 
for intervention that he would have been at least 
a proper party to the action when it was com-
menced and in which he seeks to intervene, and 
that he would have been entitled to the relief he 
seeks in a separate action in the same court 
against the parties against whom he seeks relief." 
Price v. Hansen, 60 U.29, 206 P. 272. 
In the case now before the Court, it is inexorably 
clear that the plaintiff could not have made the applicant 
intervenor a party defendant in any case, however much 
desired. 
Transnational Insurance Company was not a proper 
party to the lawsuit "when it was commenced" and is 
not now. 
CONCLUSION 
In the case before the Court, the appellant failed to 
accord the plaintiff with the good faith to be expected of 
a fiduciary. In the process, the appellant may have also 
failed to protect its own only lately alleged self-interest. 
The tortf easors are adequately proteeted by counsel 
of their own choice. The appellant's application for in-
tervention was untimely, inadequately factually sup-
2::1 
ported and defective in failing to comply with the spe-
cific requirements of Rule 24 ( c) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
There are serious ethical and conceptual problems 
tied to the issue of the intervention of the insurer. 'fhese 
problems are theoretically the same whether the issue 
is joinder by the insured or intervention by the insurer. 
The appellant did not move the Trial Court to ob-
scure its identity. Rather it claimed the "right" as "a 
defendant" to "litigate the matter of liability and dam-
ages" and to file an answer as if it were a party (R. 16). 
The interests of the appellant in this case are ade-
quately protected. 
The decision of the Trial Court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
JOEL M. ALLRED 
610 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorney for Resp-O't'1dent 
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